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SEXUAL ASSAULT AND INTOXICATION: DEFINING 
(IN)CAPACITY TO CONSENT
Elaine Craig*
This article considers how the law of sexual assault in Canada addresses 
cases involving intoxicated complainants. There are two main aspects to the 
law of capacity to consent to sexual touching in the context of intoxicated 
women. The first involves the evidence of intoxication courts typically 
require in order to prove lack of capacity. The second pertains to the legal 
standard to which that evidence is applied. The nature of the evidence 
required to establish incapacity turns on the level of capacity the law 
requires. A comprehensive review of Canadian caselaw involving intoxicated 
complainants reveals a legal standard that is too low and an evidentiary 
threshold that is too high. The result: no matter how severely intoxicated a 
woman was when the sexual contact occurred, courts are unlikely to find 
that she lacked capacity to consent unless she was unconscious during some 
or all of the sexual activity.
Dans cet article, l’auteure examine la manière dont le droit en matière 
d’agressions sexuelles au Canada traite les cas impliquant des plaignantes 
en état d’ébriété. Le droit relatif à la capacité de consentir à des 
attouchements sexuels dans le contexte de plaignantes en état d’ébriété 
comporte deux éléments principaux. Le premier a trait à la preuve de l’état 
d’ébriété généralement exigée par les tribunaux afin d’établir l’absence de 
capacité. Le second concerne la norme juridique à laquelle s’applique cette 
preuve. La nature de la preuve exigée pour établir l’absence de capacité 
dépend du degré de capacité exigé par la loi. Un examen approfondi de 
la jurisprudence canadienne impliquant des plaignantes en état d’ébriété 
témoigne d’ une norme juridique qui n’est pas assez exigeante et un seuil de 
preuve trop élevé. Résultat : peu importe la gravité de son intoxication lors 
des attouchements à caractère sexuel, il est peu probable que les tribunaux 
concluent qu’une femme n’avait pas la capacité de consentir, à moins 
qu’elle ait été inconsciente pendant toute la durée ou une partie de l’activité 
sexuelle.
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1. Introduction
A woman who was too drunk to insist on a condom when she was 
ovulating, or notice the multiple sores on and around the accused’s penis 
before he penetrated her vagina, or understand the risks associated with 
allowing an unmedicated HIV positive man to ejaculate inside her, but 
aware enough to know she was being penetrated and could say no, is 
unlikely to be afforded legal protection under the law of sexual assault in 
Canada.1 A woman who was so intoxicated she was “falling down drunk,”2 
1 As will be explained in Part 4, these are the logical implications of the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal’s reasoning in R v Al-Rawi, 2018 NSCA 10 [Al-Rawi (NSCA)].
2 R v Tariq, 2016 ONCJ 614 at para 94 [Tariq]: “the court cannot conclude 
incapacity to consent from the mere fact that the complainant is effectively falling down 
drunk”.
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3 R v TJ, 2018 ONSC 6385 at paras 12, 27 [TJ] (complainant found to have 
capacity despite evidence she was “very intoxicated”, slurring her words and had vomited 
on herself). 
4 R v C(K), 2016 ABPC 242 at para 19 [KC].
5 Bill C-51, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department of Justice Act 
and to make consequential amendments to another Act, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2018, (assented 
to 13 December 2018), SC 2018, c 29 [Bill C-51].
6 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1; R v GF, 2019 ONCA 493 at para 37, rev’g 2016 
ONSC 3465, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 38801 (9 January 2020) [GF]. 
7 See Janine Benedet, “The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women” (2010) 22:2 
CJWL 435; Sharon Cowan, “The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the 
Evaporation of Consent” (2008) 41:4 Akron L Rev 899.
had vomited on herself and cannot remember anything that happened,3 
or was unable to dress herself properly and was “puking up leaves,”4 is 
unlikely to be found by a Canadian court to have lacked the capacity to 
consent to the sexual touching that occurred while she was in this state. 
Unless she was also unconscious. Recent amendments to the Criminal 
Code definition of consent to sexual touching are unlikely to remedy this 
failure of the criminal law in Canada.
This article considers how the law of sexual assault in Canada 
addresses cases involving intoxicated complainants. There are two main, 
interrelated aspects to the law of capacity to consent to sexual touching 
in the context of intoxicated women. The first involves the evidence of 
intoxication courts typically require in order to prove lack of capacity. The 
second pertains to the legal standard to which that evidence is applied. 
The nature of the evidence required to establish incapacity turns on the 
level of capacity the law requires. A comprehensive review of Canadian 
caselaw involving intoxicated complainants reveals a legal standard that is 
too low and an evidentiary threshold that is too high. 
Two legal developments to the law of capacity to consent to sexual 
touching have occurred in the past two years in Canada: one through 
revisions to the Criminal Code pursuant to Bill C-51,5 and a second through 
interpretation by appellate courts in Nova Scotia and Ontario.6 Neither of 
these legal developments will serve to clarify this uncertain and difficult 
area of sexual assault law. Neither of these legal developments will aid in 
protecting the sexual integrity of severely intoxicated women—a group 
who are at greatly increased risk of sexual violence and who currently 
receive very little legal protection.7 
The remainder of the article is divided into four parts. Part 2 
explains why the federal government’s recent revision to the Criminal 
Code definition of consent to sexual touching was both unnecessary and 
illogical. Part 3 examines the evidentiary approach courts have taken in 
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8 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1.
9 GF, supra note 6 at para 37.
sexual assault cases involving severely intoxicated women. One of the 
challenges with the lack of certainty in the caselaw, and the lack of an 
adequate statutory definition for incapacity, is that judges risk conflating 
incapacity and unconsciousness such that they inadvertently become co-
extensive. The result is an extremely onerous evidentiary requirement in 
which, absent evidence of unconsciousness, even profoundly intoxicated 
women will not be found to have lacked capacity to consent. Of course, 
the evidentiary approach taken in incapacity cases will turn on the legal 
standard for capacity that courts rely upon. 
Part 4 shifts focus from the statutory framework and evidentiary 
approach to incapacity due to intoxication to the legal standard for 
capacity recently established by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal,8 and 
subsequently adopted by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v GF.9 The 
legal standard articulated by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R v Al-
Rawi, that borrows from the sexual fraud caselaw, uses language which 
was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in the sexual fraud context 
as unclear and difficult to apply. Moreover, the standard in Al-Rawi and 
GF is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s description in R v (A)J of 
“meaningful consent” and is insufficiently protective of women’s sexual 
integrity and the right of everyone to make meaningful choices about their 
sexual activities. 
Building on the previous section, Part 5 articulates a legal standard 
for capacity to consent and its application by courts that would be 
more protective of severely intoxicated individuals. A capacity standard 
should include the ability to understand the context specific risks and 
consequences of engaging in the sexual activity in question. A more robust 
legal standard for capacity would encourage judges to give more weight to 
evidence of severe intoxication short of unconsciousness. Part 5 suggests 
that judges must do more than articulate this standard. They must apply it 
to the evidence before them. This may require, in part, further excavation 
and disruption of our stereotypical assumptions about drunk women and 
sex.
2. Adding Unconsciousness to Section 273.1(2) Was an 
Unnecessary and Illogical Revision to the Criminal Code
In order to understand the problems with the federal government’s recent 
revisions to the Criminal Code and recent appellate decisions in Nova 
Scotia and Ontario, it is useful to first consider the legislative framework 
for the criminal law definition of consent to sexual touching, as well as how 
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10 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].
11 R v Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19 at para 4 [Hutchinson].
12 Ibid at para 57. The Hutchinson majority’s description of the two-stage 
framework established by the Criminal Code encourages a problematic application of 
the law of consent not directly related to the issue of capacity. See Lise Gotell, “Thinly 
Construing the Nature of the Act Legally Consented To: The Corrosive Impact of R v 
Hutchinson On the Law of Consent” (2020) 53:1 UBC L Rev 53. Lise Gotell demonstrates 
how an unduly narrow understanding of the ‘specific physical act at issue’ at stage one of 
the analysis will result in legal reasoning that expects women to prevent sexual violence 
and that holds complainants responsible for the sexual harms that they have suffered. As 
Gotell notes, an interpretation of the physical act at issue which fails to include factors 
such as the degree of force used or whether the voluntary agreement was contingent on 
the use of a condom is not sufficiently protective of the complainant’s sexual integrity 
and personal autonomy. Nor, as the minority in Hutchinson, supra note 11 noted, is it 
consistent with the definition of consent established in R v Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 SCR 330, 
169 DLR (4th) 193 [Ewanchuk cited to SCR]. Whether a complainant voluntarily agreed to 
the sexual act at issue is based on her subjective state of mind at the time the sexual touching 
occurred. Take the example of condom use. A woman whose voluntarily agreement to 
engage in sexual intercourse was contingent on the use of a condom cannot be said to 
have, as a subjective matter, voluntarily agreed to sexual intercourse which occurred after 
it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada. The legislative 
framework is found in sections 265(3) and 273.1 of the Criminal Code.10
In R v Hutchinson, the Supreme Court of Canada explained the two-
stage process for analyzing consent to sexual touching as set out in the 
Criminal Code.11 The first step—which is found in section 273.1(1)—
involves determining whether the complainant did not voluntarily consent 
to the sexual activity in question. The second step of the analysis requires 
an assessment of whether the complainant’s voluntary agreement was 
not legally effective. Section 265(3) enumerates circumstances in which 
a complainant’s voluntary agreement will not be legally effective, such 
as consent vitiated by fraud. Section 273.1(2) also identifies some of the 
circumstances in which a complainant’s voluntary agreement will not be 
legally effective—one such circumstance being because the complainant 
lacked the capacity to consent to the sexual activity in question. 
The first stage of the analysis, whether the complainant voluntarily 
agreed to the sexual activity in question under section 273.1(1), encompasses 
consideration of three factors: did the complainant voluntarily agree to 
engage in the specific physical act at issue, with knowledge that the act 
was of a sexual nature (for example, that it was a sexual act not a medical 
exam), and awareness of the identity of the individual with whom the 
sexual contact occurred.12 
If the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant 
did not voluntarily agree to the touching, its sexual nature, or the identity 
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of the individual touching her, then lack of consent is established.13 The 
consent analysis is complete. The (lack of) consent element of the actus 
reus for the offence of sexual assault is satisfied.
However, if the evidence suggests that the complainant did voluntarily 
agree to the sexual activity in question or there is a reasonable doubt as to 
her lack of agreement, then the second stage of the analysis is applied. 
The second stage asks: are there circumstances, such as those enumerated 
under sections 265(3) and 273.1(2), which render the complainant’s 
supposed voluntary agreement, or apparent consent, legally ineffective? 
Under the Criminal Code’s framework, the complainant’s capacity to 
consent is not assessed until this second stage of the analysis. In other 
words, the issue of capacity only arises in cases in which the evidence 
demonstrates voluntary agreement or raises a reasonable doubt as to the 
complainant’s involuntariness.14 
In December 2018, the Criminal Code definition of consent to sexual 
touching was revised for the first time in more than 25 years.15 One of 
the amendments under Bill C-51 added a provision to the Criminal Code 
stipulating that an unconscious person is incapable of consenting.16 
This newly added section (section 273.1(2)(a.1)) states that “no consent 
is obtained if … the complainant is unconscious.”17 Parliament’s stated 
purpose for this amendment was to codify the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the case of R v (A)J.18 This revision to the Criminal 
Code was unnecessary. There is no indication in the reported caselaw that 
trial judges were struggling with how to apply this aspect of the decision 
in JA. It is clear that trial judges in Canada consistently recognized that 
an unconscious person cannot consent to sexual activity. There have 
the accused surreptitiously removed the condom. Some lower courts have refused to find 
that there was voluntary agreement where consent was contingent on the use of a condom 
and the accused removed the condom without consent: see R v Rivera, 2019 ONSC 3918 
at para 24; R v SY, 2017 ONCJ 798 at para 40. But this flaw in the majority’s reasoning in 
Hutchinson does risk creating this type of problematic outcome. See R v Lupi, 2019 ONSC 
3713 at para 31. 
13 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at paras 4–5.
14 Ewanchuk, supra note 12 at 353. See also GF, supra note 6 at para 41; R v 
Kishayinew, 2019 SKCA 127 at para 19.
15 Bill C-51, supra note 5.
16 Ibid, ss 10(1), 19(1).
17 Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 273.1(2)(a.1). 
18 R v A(J), 2011 SCC 28 [JA]. See Bill C-51, supra note 5 and legislative Summary: 
“Legislative Summary of Bill C-51: An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Department 
of Justice Act and to make consequential amendments to another Act” (accessed 21 April 
2020) online: Parliament of Canada <lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/
ResearchPublications/LegislativeSummaries/421C51E#a29>.
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been no reported cases, since JA, in which a court made the legal error of 
concluding otherwise.19 One appellate court went so far as to characterize 
this aspect of the legal definition of consent as axiomatic.20 The Canadian 
judiciary was not confused as to whether an unconscious person could 
consent to sex, making this amendment unnecessary. 
In addition, given the two-stage analytical framework for consent 
established under sections 273.1(1) and 273.1(2) of the Criminal Code (and 
illuminated in Hutchinson), it was illogical to specify unconsciousness as a 
circumstance in which apparent consent, or voluntary agreement, under 
section 273.1(1) is vitiated under section 273.1(2). 
Recall that section 273.1(2) is only considered if the complainant 
did voluntarily agree (or there is a reasonable doubt as to whether she 
did not voluntarily agree) to the sexual activity in question.21 Voluntary 
agreement to the sexual activity in question means she agreed to the 
specific physical act at issue, knowing both the identity of the individual 
with whom the sexual contact occurred, and that it was a sexual act 
(rather than, for example, a medical exam or an airport pat down).22 
An unconscious person cannot voluntarily agree to be touched, nor can 
they know the identity of the person touching them, nor that the contact 
is of a sexual nature.23 Agreeing and knowing these facts in advance is 
insufficient; consent to sexual touching must be contemporaneous.24 
Thus, even if when the sexual activity commenced the complainant was in 
voluntary agreement, the moment she became unconscious this voluntary 
agreement, or apparent consent, vanished. In other words, if the Crown 
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual contact occurred while 
the complainant was unconscious, or shifting in and out of consciousness, 
then the ‘lack of voluntary agreement to the sexual activity in question’ test 
under section 273.1(1) is satisfied. The actus reus is proven.25 There is no 
need following this conclusion, nor does it make sense, to then consider 
the issue of capacity (or any of the other subsections of section 265(3) 
19 A search of sexual assault cases since JA on CanLII, conducted on September 
12, 2019, did not produce any cases in which trial judges found that sexual touching of an 
unconscious complainant was consensual.
20 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at paras 33–34.
21 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 4.
22 Ibid at paras 4–5.
23 JA, supra note 18 at para 66.
24 Ibid. Bill C-51, supra note 5 also codified this aspect of JA; See Criminal Code, 
supra note 10, s 273.1(1.1).
25 Ewanchuk, supra note 12.
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and 273.1(2) that render a complainant’s voluntary agreement legally 
ineffective).26 
Again, an unconscious, or intermittently conscious, complainant 
cannot voluntarily agree to the sexual activity in question. It is true that 
‘no consent is obtained if the complainant is unconscious’ but this is 
because unconscious people cannot voluntarily agree to the sexual activity 
in question, not because they lack the capacity to grant an agreement they 
voluntarily provided. 
Given the structure of section 273.1(1) and (2) (prior to the 
amendment), and the clear direction of the Supreme Court in Hutchinson 
and Ewanchuk to analyze the consent element of the actus reus as a two-
stage process, it was illogical to codify unconsciousness as a capacity issue 
under stage two. Instead, courts should consider at stage one whether the 
complainant was unconscious during some or all of the sexual touching 
that occurred. Any sexual activity that occurred while the complainant 
was unconscious occurred without her voluntary agreement.27 In addition 
to making the analysis of consent more coherent, this would have the 
added benefit of helping courts to avoid wrongly relying on evidence of 
unconsciousness as the proxy for findings of incapacity, as explained in 
Part 3. 
More problematic than its lack of necessity and logic, this law reform 
effort on the part of Parliament was a wasted opportunity to revise the 
Criminal Code to clarify and improve what is an area of ambiguity and 
confusion in the caselaw regarding capacity to consent: the level of 
intoxication, short of unconsciousness, at which an individual lacks 
capacity to consent to sexual touching.28 Even worse, and as will be 
26 See e.g. Ibid at 353: “Section 265(3) identifies an additional set of circumstances 
in which the accused’s conduct will be culpable. The trial judge only has to consult s. 265(3) 
in those cases where the complainant has actually chosen to participate in sexual activity, 
or her ambiguous conduct or submission has given rise to doubt as to the absence of 
consent”.
27 Even before this unfortunate amendment to the Criminal Code some courts 
failed to recognize where evidence of unconsciousness fit in this two-step framework. See 
e.g. R v Cadieux, 2019 CM 2011. For a pre-Hutchinson example, see R v Ashlee, 2006 ABCA 
244. Other courts, however, have properly applied this analytical framework. See e.g. Judge 
Buckle’s recent decision in R v Percy, 2018 NSPC 57 at para 78 [Percy].
28 The opportunity need not have been lost. During the legislative process, Senator 
Kim Pate repeatedly advocated for a definition of capacity which included the ability to 
assess risks and consequences to be added to Bill C-51. While the Senate adopted Senator 
Pate’s amendment to Bill C-51 it was later rejected by the House of Commons. Brian 
Platt, “Despite appeals from women’s groups, Liberals reject Senate amendments to bill 
on sexual consent” (11 December 2018), online: National Post <nationalpost.com/news/
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demonstrated in the next section, the unnecessary codification of the 
ruling in JA, that an unconscious person is incapable of consent, risks 
inadvertently reifying a problematic trend in the caselaw: the reliance on 
a state of unconsciousness as the proxy for incapacity. Instead of helping 
trial judges not to rely on unconsciousness as the marker of incapacity 
such that the two are treated as co-extensive, this amendment to the 
Criminal Code definition of consent may, by emphasizing or singling out 
unconsciousness, make this mistake more likely.29
To summarize, the newly enacted section 273.1(2)(a.1)—stipulating 
that no consent is obtained if the complainant is unconscious—was 
both unnecessary and illogical. Unconsciousness has no place in section 
273.1(2) of the Criminal Code. Most importantly, and as explained in Part 
4, its inclusion in section 273.1(2) risks creating further problems with the 
application of the law of consent in cases involving severely intoxicated 
women. 
3. The Evidentiary Threshold: Intoxication Short of 
Unconsciousness Will Almost Never Result in a Finding of 
Incapacity
With the exception of the newly adopted provision regarding 
unconsciousness, the Criminal Code does not define what constitutes 
incapacity to consent to sexual touching. This leaves it to courts to identify 
and apply the threshold for capacity to consent. Courts have applied 
different legal standards and have struggled to identify those circumstances, 
short of unconsciousness, in which an intoxicated complainant should be 
found to have lacked the capacity to grant the voluntary agreement they 
provided.30 While it is clear that an unconscious individual cannot consent 
to sexual touching, and that this is not where the line should be drawn, 
there is inconsistency and uncertainty about what level of intoxication 
does render a complainant’s voluntary agreement, or apparent consent, 
legally ineffective. The result is that unconsciousness continues to serve as 
the primary marker of incapacity due to intoxication. 
The role that evidence of unconsciousness continues to play in 
assessments of capacity—despite explicit recognition by courts that 
the legal standard does not require unconsciousness—is perhaps best 
politics/despite-appeals-from-womens-groups-liberals-reject-senate-amendments-to-
bill-on-sexual-consent>. 
29 Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 273.1(2)(b). It is true that section 273.1(2)(b) of 
the Criminal Code stipulates that “[no consent is obtained if] the complainant is incapable 
of consenting to the activity for any reason other than the one referred to in paragraph 
(a.1)”. Nevertheless, the effect of the amendment is to single out unconsciousness.
30 Benedet, supra note 7. 
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demonstrated by one of the most significant trends in capacity to consent 
cases involving intoxication. Professor Janine Benedet’s 2010 study 
revealed that, in the vast majority of cases, judges only found that a 
voluntarily31 intoxicated complainant lacked capacity if she was asleep or 
unconscious during some or all of the sexual touching that occurred (and 
in some cases only if she was asleep or unconscious at the time the sexual 
activity commenced).32 A review of the past ten years of caselaw, since 
Benedet’s study was conducted, reveals a similar pattern.33 While there 
are exceptions, cases involving intoxicated complainants tend to only 
result in convictions on the basis of lack of capacity to consent if there is 
evidence that the complainant was asleep or unconscious during some or 
all of the sexual touching that occurred.34 In many of these convictions the 
evidence demonstrated an expressed lack of voluntary agreement on the 
part of the complainant, in addition to the evidence of unconsciousness.35 
In other words, in most of the cases in which an accused is convicted of 
non-consensual sexual touching involving an intoxicated woman, the 
complainant’s evidence was that she regained consciousness or awoke 
31 Ibid. Benedet identified an important distinction between cases involving 
voluntarily intoxicated complainants and those that were drugged. Courts were more 
likely to find incapacity if the complainant was involuntarily intoxicated. As she notes, 
findings of incapacity should not turn on whether the complainant’s intoxication was 
voluntary. That they do suggests that victim blaming stereotypes might be operating in 
those cases in which the complainant chose to consume intoxicating substances.
32 Ibid.
33 A search was conducted of the CanLII database for all sexual assault cases 
between January 2010 and November 2019 in which the issue of capacity was raised, or 
the complainant’s level of intoxication, voluntary or involuntary, was discussed. Over 250 
cases were examined.
34 For cases in which findings of incapacity were made (all of which involved 
evidence that the complainant was unconscious or asleep for all or some part of the 
incident) see e.g. Percy, supra note 27; R v Joe, 2010 YKTC 134; R v CL, 2017 ONSC 3202; R 
v James, 2013 BCCA 159; R v JLW, 2011 ABPC 255; R v Tweneboah-Koduah, 2017 ONSC 
640, aff’d 2018 ONCA 570 [Tweneboah]; R v Smarch, 2013 YKTC 114; R v Rosenthal, 2014 
YKTC 35; R v Ransom, 2011 NWTSC 33; Randall v R, 2012 NBCA 25; R v WAR, 2013 
BCSC 1767; R v BLP, 2011 ABCA 384 [BLP]; R v Ningiuk, 2017 NUCJ 06; R v Mitrovic, 
2017 ONSC 1829 [Mitrovic]; R v McNab, 2010 SKQB 169 [McNab]; R v McLean, 2014 
BCSC 1293; R v Gai, 2014 ABPC 158; R v Cubillan, 2015 ONSC 969; R v SAA, 2014 ONCJ 
261. But see R v FBP, 2016 ONCJ 860; Tariq, supra note 2. (In these cases, the accused was 
convicted on the basis of strong evidence of extreme intoxication but which did not include 
evidence of lack of consciousness). In R v CL, 2017 ONSC 3202 at para 104, the accused 
was convicted on the basis that the complainant, who had been unconscious within a very 
short time period before the sexual touching, was “not totally asleep” but was “very drunk, 
barely conscious and blacking out”.
35 See e.g. Tweneboah, supra note 34; R v Stewart, 2012 YKSC 75; BLP, supra note 
34; Mitrovic, supra note 34; McNab, supra note 34.
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to find herself being sexually assaulted by the accused and that she, 
at that point, attempted to resist verbally or physically. In several cases 
this resistance upon awaking was met with significant physical violence 
perpetrated against the complainant by the accused.36 
What happens in cases in which there is no evidence that the severely 
intoxicated complainant was unconscious when the sexual touching 
occurred?
A) Some judges explicitly, but erroneously, require evidence 
of unconsciousness to find incapacity
The most obvious problem occurs in cases in which judges explicitly 
determine that lack of sufficient evidence of unconsciousness raises a 
reasonable doubt regarding incapacity. In two recent cases, courts of 
appeal have overturned trial decisions to acquit on the basis of this error.37 
In R v WLS, the accused’s 11-year-old son testified that he witnessed his 
father drag his maternal aunt from her bedroom into the living room 
while she was asleep, undress her, and sexually assault her repeatedly.38 
Judge Moher acquitted the accused on the basis that lack of consent had 
not been proven because “‘unconsciousness’ was [not] the only reasonable 
inference available on the evidence.”39 In affirming the Court of Appeal of 
Alberta’s decision to overturn the acquittal, the Supreme Court of Canada 
stated: “[i]n our view, the act of dragging the complainant while asleep and 
drugged is inconsistent with any sort of consent.”40 As the Court noted, it 
is an error of law to conclude that nothing short of unconsciousness will 
amount to incapacity.41 
The same type of error was overturned by the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal in R v Al-Rawi. Al-Rawi involved allegations of sexual assault 
against a Halifax taxi driver who was found by the police in his cab late 
at night with an unconscious and naked from the breasts down woman 
passenger. He was in between her legs with his pants undone and partially 
lowered. There was a condom on the console in the front seat. The 
complainant had urinated in her clothing and had no memory of what 
occurred. Al-Rawi was acquitted.42 On appeal, Justice Beveridge agreed 
36 See e.g. R v Roberts, 2016 NWTSC 47.
37 R v WLS, 2018 ABCA 363 [WLS (ABCA)]; Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1.
38 WLS (ABCA), supra note 37 at para 2.
39 Ibid at paras 4–5.
40 R v WLS, 2019 SCC 27 at para 4.
41 Ibid at paras 4–5.
42 R v Al-Rawi (9–10 February 2017), Halifax 2866665 (NS Prov Ct (Crim Div)) 
[Al-Rawi 2017]. Al-Rawi was acquitted in a second trial on the basis of different reasoning: 
R v Al-Rawi, 2019 NSPC 37 at para 42 [Al-Rawi 2019]. 
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with the Crown that the trial judge had erred by “equat[ing] incapacity 
only with unconsciousness.”43 
In R v M(RN) the 20-year-old complainant, who was described by 
her parents as less mature and sophisticated than other young women 
her age, spent the weekend drinking alcohol at the 45-year-old accused’s 
residence.44 The trial judge dismissed the issue of incapacity on this basis: 
The issue of whether she had the capacity to consent in this particular case 
therefore does not arise because in light of the evidence of the complainant as I 
have reviewed it, I find that her assertion that she did not consent is not reliable. 
There is, as pointed out by Ms. Adams, no suggestion on the evidence that at 
the particular time when she became aware of the act that she was apparently 
unconscious, and her evidence is that she was conscious at that particular time.45 
Judge Baird Ellan’s reasons erroneously imply that a finding of incapacity 
requires evidence that the complainant was unconscious at the time the 
sexual touching occurred. The complainant’s evidence was that she awoke 
to find the accused penetrating her and that she recalled trying to say ‘no’, 
but that she was half asleep and drunk and “couldn’t really do anything.”46 
Having found she had a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant’s 
absence of consent, Judge Baird Ellan should have considered whether 
her possible apparent consent was legally ineffective due to her level of 
intoxication. In assessing this, she should have looked at more than just 
whether there was evidence she was unconscious at the time of the sexual 
touching.47
In the preceding cases, unconsciousness and incapacity were 
conflated such that the court treated them as co-extensive. Another type 
of error related to the sufficiency of evidence occurs when trial judges 
use unconsciousness as the reference point or evidentiary proxy for the 
capacity threshold. 
B) In some cases (lack of) unconsciousness is relied upon as 
the evidentiary proxy for identifying incapacity
In some cases, judges correctly note that unconsciousness is not the only 
state in which lack of capacity due to intoxication may be found, but their 
43 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 116.
44 R v M (RN), 2011 BCPC 199 at paras 4–8 [MRN]. 
45 Ibid at para 89.
46 Ibid at para 20.
47 Ibid at paras 88–89.
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48 See e.g. R v McKitty and Parris-Thompson, 2019 ONSC 1501 at para 60; R v MS, 
2013 ONSC 7066 at para 117, aff’d R v Shahbaz, 2016 ONCA 636; R v NB, 2018 ONCJ 527 
[NB].
49 TJ, supra note 3 at para 27. 
50 Ibid at para 62.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid at paras 63–64.
53 Ibid. 
analysis of the evidence of intoxication suggests that they may nevertheless 
be relying on unconsciousness as a type of proxy to identify incapacity.48
In R v TJ, evidence of the 18-year-old complainant’s state of 
intoxication included her testimony that she had experienced an alcohol-
induced blackout, testimony from a friend who described her as “very 
intoxicated” and “slurring [her] words,” and evidence from the accused 
that she had vomited on her clothing.49 With the exception of her loss 
of memory (which he treated not as circumstantial evidence of lack of 
capacity but as a detriment to the Crown’s case on the issue of consent), 
Justice de Sa’s capacity analysis made no mention of any of this evidence 
of her level of intoxication. Instead he focussed on the lack of evidence of 
unconsciousness. He highlighted the Crown’s acknowledgment that there 
was no evidence that the complainant was unconscious or incapacitated 
on the way back from the party.50 He noted the complainant’s memory of 
observing the accused on top of her having intercourse, just before turning 
her head to the side and closing her eyes.51 He concluded that
to rely on this evidence of the complainant to conclude she was unconscious at this 
specific time would be dangerous in my view. I have no context for this memory, 
or any understanding of where in the sexual encounter it may have taken place … 
The complainant has no actual memory of the events, nor is there any meaningful 
evidence indicating she lacked the capacity to consent.52
Evidence of an alcohol-induced blackout, slurred words, and vomiting 
is “meaningful evidence indicating she lacked the capacity to consent.”53 
Whether this evidence established lack of capacity beyond a reasonable 
doubt is a separate (and in this case unanswered) question. The point is 
that Justice de Sa does not appear to have given it any weight, and instead 
focussed his capacity analysis on what he deemed to be insufficient 
evidence of unconsciousness. 
In some cases, courts identify evidence of apparent consent, highlight 
the lack of evidence of unconsciousness, and then stop the analysis without 
assessing whether the evidence of extreme intoxication establishes lack 
of capacity. This type of reasoning also seems to be relying upon lack of 
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evidence of unconsciousness as the reference point for incapacity.54 For 
example, in R v Bisaillon the police found the complainant on the grass 
outside the accused’s apartment at 3:42 a.m. with the accused on top 
of her.55 Neither was wearing pants, nor underwear. She was unable to 
maintain her balance. Justice Blouin commented that “she was conscious 
but intoxicated and when asked whether she wanted to be there her answer 
was unintelligible.”56 She had no memory of these events. According to the 
decision, “[t]he Crown led a significant body of evidence which suggested 
the complainant was extremely intoxicated.”57 A toxicologist testified that 
her blood alcohol content would have been between 201 and 278 at the 
time of the incident. Even the accused’s evidence was that she “was pretty 
drunk.”58 He testified that he had to help her up to sit on a patio chair after 
she fell and hit her head on a concrete step. All three police officers who 
attended the scene that early morning testified to her “disoriented state, 
her inability to stand unaided, her slurred speech and incoherence, her 
extreme intoxication.”59 
The accused was acquitted on the basis that the Crown failed to prove 
absence of consent. Justice Blouin based his decision on the evidence of 
two other witnesses. One of these witnesses testified that the complainant 
and the accused had been flirting and kissing and that the complainant 
seemed “all over him.”60 The other witness testified that from his balcony 
he saw a naked woman on top of a man on the grass and that she appeared 
to be “leading” the sexual activity.61 
This evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to whether there 
was voluntary agreement or apparent consent. The problem with Justice 
Blouin’s reasoning is that he should have, in light of this evidence and 
conclusion, fully considered the second stage of the analysis. He failed to 
properly assess whether this apparent consent was legally effective given 
the complainant’s level of intoxication. 
In R v C(K), the 15-year-old complainant and 16-year-old accused 
attended the same party on the date of the complainant’s 15th birthday.62 
54 See e.g. R v Bisaillon, 2014 ONCJ 577 [Bisaillon]; R v MLF (2013), BCPC 0183; 
NB, supra note 48.
55 Bisaillon, supra note 54.
56 Ibid at para 3.
57 Ibid at para 12.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid at para 13.
60 Ibid at para 16. Oddly Justice Blouin relied on this witness’ evidence despite 
finding that she was not credible earlier in his decision, at para 11.
61 Ibid at para 17.
62 KC, supra note 4.
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63 Ibid at paras 8–16, 27.
64 Ibid at para 19.
65 Ibid at paras 18–20.
66 Ibid at para 22.
67 Ibid at paras 54, 62.
68 Ibid at para 69.
69 Ibid at para 59.
70 Ibid at para 69.
She testified that at the party, the accused approached her repeatedly. 
Eventually she agreed to follow him to his truck, which was locked. 
According to her, they walked away from the party to a secluded area. She 
alleged that the accused then placed her on the ground, removed her pants 
and penetrated her vaginally with his penis. He did not use a condom.63 
The complainant testified that when they left the party, prior to the 
alleged sexual assault, she was stumbling and slurring her words. She 
estimated that her level of intoxication at that point was an eight or nine 
out of ten. When she returned to the party she was upset, her thong 
underwear was on the outside of her pants. 
The complainant’s friend testified that the complainant was at a level 
of intoxication of approximately eight or nine out of ten and that she 
got progressively drunker as the party went on. She stated that she went 
with the complainant to the bathroom after the incident and witnessed 
her “puking up leaves.”64 She said the complainant’s underwear was on 
outside of her pants; she was stumbling; she had to hold herself up to keep 
her balance; and she had an impaired ability to speak.65 A third friend also 
testified that the complainant’s level of intoxication by the end of the party 
was an eight out of ten.66
In his decision to acquit, Judge Norheim accepted that the 15-year-
old complainant was “highly intoxicated,”67 “significantly affected by 
alcohol”68 and that she had consumed a “large amount of liquor.”69 Despite 
the evidence of two other witnesses that she was an eight or nine out of 
ten on the scale of intoxication, and the evidence of one of those witnesses 
that she was stumbling, unable to keep her balance, had reappeared at 
the party with her underwear on outside of her pants, and was vomiting 
up leaves directly following the incident, Judge Norheim determined 
that there were no grounds to vitiate consent. He noted that there was no 
“substantiated evidence” that she was staggering and slurring her words 
prior to the incident and that the brief video clip introduced by the Crown 
“showed her walking in a relatively normal fashion immediately before 
the sexual encounter.”70 
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Judge Norheim’s discussion of the caselaw on the issue of capacity 
was as follows, “[t]he authorities establish that if the complainant is drunk 
to the point of unconsciousness she cannot consent to sexual activity from 
that unconscious state. I have found no authority which directs that a 
person under the influence of alcohol cannot consent to sexual activity.”71 
The only authorities he relied on were R v (A)J and R v Ashlee.72 In both 
JA and Ashlee the complainant was unconscious. This was the extent of 
his treatment of the jurisprudence on capacity. While he did concede that 
“there may be cases where the evidence establishes that a person was so 
intoxicated that they were unable to give consent,”73 he determined that 
this was not one of them.74 
Reflective of the paradox that complainants who were intoxicated at 
the time of the sexual incident often face, Judge Norheim concluded that, 
“the consumption of alcohol has affected the reliability of her memory. 
However, the evidence tends to show a functioning mind and a conscious, 
if somewhat reckless decision, to accompany the defendant.”75 Too drunk 
to be believed, not drunk enough to lack capacity.
In R v Tariq, a case that has been cited numerous times since its 2016 
release,76 Justice Greene reviews the caselaw on capacity to consent.77 
Some of the cases cited with approval by Justice Greene in Tariq articulate 
a shockingly onerous evidentiary burden resulting in a shockingly low 
standard for capacity to consent to sexual touching. For example, she 
states that “[t]he extreme level of intoxication that is required to prove 
incapacity to consent was recently illustrated … in R v Hinds [2016] OJ No 
71 Ibid at para 66.
72 Ibid at paras 67–68.
73 Ibid at para 71 [emphasis added].
74 Ibid.
75 KC, supra note 4 at para 70. Of note, the complainant’s capacity to decide to leave 
the party with the accused was not the issue and the characterization of this decision as 
“reckless” raises the spectre of discriminatory and victim blaming attitudes about women 
who make so called ‘risky choices’ such as to consume alcohol, or allow themselves to 
be alone with men. See Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual 
Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41:4 Akron L Rev 865 
[Gotell 2008]. KC, supra note 4 at para 59, Judge Norheim further stated, “The totality of 
the evidence, however, suggests that it is equally likely that the large amount of liquor she 
consumed that night lowered her inhibitions and clouded her memory having the effect of 
causing her to engage in risky sexual behavior that she would not have otherwise engaged 
in. Specifically having unprotected sex with someone she hardly knew”.
76 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1; GF, supra note 6; R v CP, 2017 ONCJ 277; R v 
Kodwat, 2017 YKTC 66; R v DC, 2018 NUCJ 20; R v PJB, 2019 NSSC 109; R v MM, 2018 
ONCJ 15; R v JP, 2018 ONSC 889; R v Whitteker, 2019 ONCJ 180; R v Carpov, 2018 ONSC 
6650.
77 Tariq, supra note 2.
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257 (SCJ).”78 She notes that the complainant in Hinds was “so impaired 
that she was unable to dress herself” and that according to another witness 
she “looked blank at times and was zigzagging.”79 The trial judge in Hinds 
found that the Crown had not proven incapacity. 
In Justice Greene’s view, “this judgment establishes just how intoxicated 
one must be to lose capacity to consent.”80 She states that “[c]ases where 
extreme intoxication have led to findings of incapacity to consent tend 
to be cases where the evidence of intoxication is far beyond the loss of 
gross motor skills and balance. These cases tend to include evidence of 
a loss of awareness or loss of consciousness.”81 Indeed, a woman whose 
level of intoxication is far beyond the loss of gross motor skills likely is 
unconscious.82 The toxicologist in Al-Rawi explained the progression of 
intoxication as follows:
A low blood alcohol concentration, meaning up to 150 milligrams percent, is 
associated with talkativeness, sociability, euphoria, and muscle relaxation. There 
is deterioration in mental functioning such as judgement, attention, perception 
and comprehension. There is an increase in risk-taking behaviour and in self-
confidence.
At a blood alcohol concentration of 150 milligrams percent, the effects of 
alcohol become more numerous and pronounced … The individual may display 
gross motor incoordination, meaning slurred speech, staggering gait, motor 
incoordination and emotional disturbances. Intoxication is an advanced state of 
impairment such that the outward physical signs of the deteriorating effects of 
alcohol become apparent. 
A blood alcohol concentration of 250 milligrams percent is associated with severe 
intoxication, meaning marked muscular incoordination, an inability to stand 
or walk, as well as feelings of apathy and ataxia, meaning loss of motor control. 
There may also be exaggerated emotional states as well as incontinence or loss of 
consciousness.83
78 Ibid at para 86 [emphasis added].
79 Ibid at para 86.
80 Ibid at para 87 [emphasis added].
81 Ibid at para 92.
82 See for e.g. Steven S Nemerson, “Alcoholism, Intoxication, and the Criminal 
Law” (1988) 10 Cardozo L Rev 393:3 at 403, citing Frank Seixas, “The Course of Alcoholism” 
in Nada J Estes & M Edith Heinemann, eds, Alcoholism: Development, Consequences, and 
Interventions, 3rd ed (St. Louis: Mosby, 1986). See also Rolla N Harger, “The Pharmacology 
and Toxicology of Alcohol” in Chemical Tests for Intoxication: Manual (Committee on 
Medicolegal Problems, American Medical Association, 1959) 11 at 13.
83 Al-Rawi 2019, supra note 42 at paras 118–20.
Sexual Assault and Intoxication: Defining (In)Capacity to …2020] 87
Justice Greene’s suggestion that a finding of incapacity must be based 
on evidence of intoxication far beyond loss of gross motor skills, such 
as evidence of loss of awareness or consciousness, is essentially an 
instruction to courts to use unconsciousness as the evidentiary proxy for 
lack of capacity. While she did not rely on unconsciousness as the proxy 
for incapacity in Tariq,84 and she was correct that this is what courts have 
typically demanded before making a finding of incapacity, requiring 
evidence of intoxication far beyond the loss (not the impairment but the 
loss) of gross motor skills sets the threshold too low. It sets the evidentiary 
standard at bare consciousness. As a practical matter, stipulating that 
findings of incapacity cannot be made without evidence of intoxication far 
beyond the loss of gross motor skills, such as evidence of unconsciousness 
or loss of awareness, is no different than concluding that the legal standard 
for incapacity is unconsciousness. 
In addition to being unnecessary, enumerating unconsciousness, 
and only unconsciousness, as a circumstance in which “no consent is 
obtained” might inadvertently perpetuate this problem. It is true that 
the Criminal Code now clearly stipulates that unconsciousness is not 
the only state in which incapacity will be found.85 However, given that 
unconsciousness is the only guidance Parliament gives on conditions of 
incapacity, the 2018 Criminal Code amendment may encourage judges to 
continue to rely inexplicitly on lack of consciousness as the evidentiary 
proxy for incapacity. 
C) Requiring evidence of unconsciousness as the 
evidentiary proxy for incapacity fails to distinguish between 
complainants with lowered inhibitions and loss of inhibitions
Justice Greene states in Tariq that, based on the caselaw, courts cannot 
conclude incapacity to consent from the mere fact that the complainant is 
effectively “falling down drunk.”86 The failure to find incapacity in cases 
with this level of intoxication may flow, in part, from a lack of distinction 
between someone with relaxed or lowered inhibitions and impaired gross 
motor skills and someone with no inhibition, someone who has lost the 
ability to control themselves.
In Tariq Justice Greene commented, “[h]aving sexual intercourse 
with someone whose inhibitions are relaxed due to the consumption 
84 Tariq, supra note 2 at para 30. Justice Greene did make a finding of incapacity 
without evidence of unconsciousness. However, in that case there was substantial videotape 
evidence of the severely intoxicated complainant including evidence of the complainant in 
an elevator being held up by the accused, with her eyes closed, and appearing to fall asleep. 
85 Criminal Code, supra note 10, s 273.1(2)(b).
86 Tariq, supra note 2 at para 94. 
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of alcohol is not a crime. Some might find this conduct unethical. But 
our law does not criminalize unethical conduct.”87 It seems obvious 
that having sex with someone whose “inhibitions are relaxed due to the 
consumption of alcohol” ought not to inspire the imposition of a criminal 
law sanction. As Justice Greene implies, not everyone would even find this 
to be unethical, let alone criminal, sexual conduct. But lowered inhibition 
and lack of inhibition are not the same thing. The cases being critiqued 
here involve women who were severely intoxicated—women who were 
slurring their speech, unable to dress themselves properly, vomiting, and/
or falling down—not women whose inhibitions were simply ‘relaxed’. 
In many cases, including Tariq, courts have relied upon the 
statement in R v Cedeno that “[m]ere drunkenness is not the equivalent of 
incapacity. Nor is alcohol-induced imprudent decision making, memory 
loss, loss of inhibitions or self control.”88 Of course mere drunkenness is 
not the equivalent of incapacity. But nor is imprudent decision-making 
equivalent to loss of self-control. How can an individual who has lost 
control of themselves have the capacity to make a meaningful choice to 
have sex? If these decisions are genuinely referring to someone who has 
lost the ability to control themselves (rather than implicitly invoking the 
stereotype that drunken women will have sex with anyone), it makes little 
sense to liken imprudent decision-making with loss of self-control. Courts 
must be careful not to equate very different levels of cognition through 
imprecise wording. Regardless, Cedeno is not a helpful precedent to 
rely on in assessing these distinctions. The complainant in Cedeno was 
unconscious when the sexual touching occurred. The issue in that case, 
as Justice Duncan recognized, was whether the Crown had proven lack 
of voluntary agreement, not whether the complainant lacked capacity.89 
That consumption of alcohol causes lowered inhibitions and risk-
taking behavior is often highlighted in capacity to consent cases.90 Judges 
in some cases raise the prospect of complainants who, with lowered 
inhibitions due to alcohol consumption, consent to sex that they would 
not have agreed to if sober.91 Decreased inhibitions and diminished 
judgment are among the first clinical signs of alcohol influence.92 In other 
87 Ibid at para 77. 
88 R v Polo Cedeno, 2005 ONCJ 91 [Cedeno]. See e.g. R v Meikle, 2011 ONSC 650 
at para 57, citing Cedeno at para 18. See also R v Nyznik, 2017 ONSC 4392; R v CS, 2019 
YKTC 43; Bisaillon, supra note 54 at para 14.
89 Cedeno, supra note 88.
90 See e.g. Al-Rawi 2019, supra note 42 at para 118; KC, supra note 4 at para 59; R v 
Zadeh, 2015 BCPC 192 at para 63; R v MD, 2017 ONSC 6776 at para 37; Percy, supra note 
27 at para 86. 
91 See e.g. NB, supra note 48 at para 30: “A person’s after-the-fact regret does 
not allow them to convert an ill-considered, drunken choice on their part into a sexual 
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words, these symptoms occur at the early stages of alcohol intoxication, 
before mental confusion, vomiting, significantly slurred speech, and loss 
of gross motor skills.93 In cases involving evidence that a complainant 
was ‘falling down drunk’, judicial emphasis on ‘mere drunkenness’ and 
sober second thoughts of post-sex regret suggests a failure to recognize 
the significant distinction between alcohol induced ‘relaxed inhibitions’ 
and loss of control of, or inability to protect, oneself. A number of factors 
inform the relationship between blood alcohol content, outward signs of 
intoxication, and cognitive capacity. Even with evidence of blood alcohol 
content at the time of the incident, toxicologists are typically unable to 
draw definitive conclusions regarding a complainant’s level of capacity 
in relation to her consumption of alcohol—unless she was unconscious. 
This uncertainty contributes to the challenges in this area of sexual 
assault law. Precise knowledge of the relationship between blood alcohol 
content, symptoms of intoxication, and cognitive capacity is unavailable. 
However, the stages of intoxication—in terms of the symptoms caused by 
progressive levels of alcohol influence—are described fairly consistently 
by toxicologists and alcohol scientists.94 Decisions that do not distinguish 
between these different stages have not appropriately assessed the issue of 
capacity. 
Judges should not conflate the feelings of euphoria, increased 
confidence, and relaxed inhibitions symptomatic of the early stages of 
intoxication with the vomiting, slurred speech, mental confusion and 
loss of gross motor skills that occurs in individuals who are conscious but 
extremely intoxicated.95 Courts must attend carefully to the distinctions 
between impaired judgment and loss of judgment, impaired gross motor 
skills and loss of gross motor skills. Imprudent decision making fuelled 
by the increased confidence and risk-taking behavior symptomatic of 
early stage intoxication should not be equated with the loss of self-control 
experienced by those who are severely intoxicated. While Justice Greene 
appears to have identified these distinctions in her analysis of the facts in 
Tariq, her treatment of the case law96—her emphasis on ‘just how drunk 
a woman needs to be’—was not helpful in this regard.97 
assault by a defendant”. Al-Rawi 2019, supra note 42; KC, supra note 4; Percy, supra note 
27. 
92 Al-Rawi 2019, supra note 42 at paras 118–20.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid. See also Kurt Dubowski, “Alcohol Determination in the Clinical 
Laboratory” (1980) 74 Am J Clin Pathology 747 at 747.
95 Al-Rawi 2019, supra note 42 at paras 118–20.
96 Tariq, supra note 2 at para 30. 
97 While she did not cite Tariq for this passage in R v CK, 2017 ONCJ 277 at para 
68, Justice Crosbie repeated this problematic passage about the evidentiary burden in 
capacity to consent cases verbatim. Like Justice Greene, she also found the complainant 
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In cases in which the complainant has little or no memory of what 
occurred, making an after-the-fact determination of her level of capacity 
while intoxicated will often require relying on some form of evidentiary 
proxy. She cannot give direct evidence of her level of cognition because she 
does not remember. Moreover, absent evidence of blood or urine alcohol 
concentration (which is not always available) the evidence of intoxication 
typically introduced in sexual assault proceedings is circumstantial 
evidence of intoxication (such as vomiting, loss of gross motor skills, 
or unconsciousness). Even evidence of blood alcohol concentration, 
which is direct evidence of intoxication, is far from direct evidence of a 
complainant’s cognitive capacity. In other words, judges are frequently 
required to make capacity findings by assessing circumstantial evidence of 
intoxication as a proxy for cognitive ability (or capacity). This, of course, 
raises the question: a proxy to determine what? The weight to be given 
particular evidence of intoxication—the value of the evidentiary proxy so 
to speak—turns on the legal standard for capacity. The lower the legal 
standard for capacity—the closer it is to bare consciousness—the more 
onerous the evidentiary requirement. 
While capacity to consent to sexual touching is frequently 
characterized by courts as an exclusively factual matter,98 common law 
assertions of ‘just how intoxicated a woman must be’ before a court will 
conclude that she lacked capacity reveal an underlying policy position 
regarding the level of protection our criminal law ought to afford 
intoxicated complainants. Whether an intoxicated individual has the level 
of sobriety to meet a particular capacity standard is, indeed, a question of 
fact. However, underpinning this question of fact is a legal question: What 
is the standard of capacity required by law? Determining this standard is a 
policy decision. The level of sobriety our criminal law should require—the 
standard itself—is as much a norm-driven, policy decision as is adopting 
a prohibition on sexual interactions with individuals below a certain level 
of maturity. 
The legal standard for capacity to consent described by the Supreme 
Court in JA supports rejecting the evidentiary approach articulated in cases 
like Tariq in favour of an assessment that is more protective of severely 
intoxicated women and more reproachful of the individuals who sexually 
exploit them. Consent, as determined by the majority of the Supreme 
Court in JA, requires a conscious, “‘capable’ or operating mind”—one that 
is capable of granting, revoking or withholding consent to each and every 
lacked capacity. In that case there was evidence she was unconscious, had vomited on 
herself, and was unable to speak or walk proximate in time to the sexual activity.
98 See e.g. NB, supra note 48 at para 32.
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sexual act.99 A complainant must have the ability to decide, at each and 
every point of sexual contact, whether and on what terms she is willing to 
engage in the activity. She must be able to evaluate each and every sexual 
activity or encounter; and she must be able to change her mind partway 
and withdraw her earlier consent.100 
It seems highly unlikely that individuals at the level of intoxication 
described in the cases cited in Tariq, women whose symptoms of 
intoxication go far beyond loss of gross motor skills, would be capable 
of deciding at each and every point of a sexual encounter whether and 
on what terms they are willing to engage in the sexual act at issue. A legal 
standard for capacity that is informed by the principles articulated in JA 
should encourage courts to place weight on evidence of outward signs 
of severe impairment such as loss of gross motor skills, vomiting, loss of 
bladder control, and significantly impaired speech, instead of relying on 
unconsciousness as the evidentiary proxy for incapacity. 
4. The Legal Standard: The Threshold Established by the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Al-Rawi Fails to Sufficiently 
Protect the Sexual Integrity of Intoxicated Women
The caselaw establishing the legal standard for capacity to consent to 
sexual touching is inconsistent.101 Different jurisdictions (or courts within 
them) articulate different thresholds. The standard has been described as 
the capacity to understand the risks and consequences associated with the 
activity,102 the ability to understand and agree,103 or something more than 
the ability to execute baseline physical functions.104 
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet provided lower courts with 
clear guidance on how to assess capacity to consent to sexual touching in 
the context of intoxication. JA is helpful but it did not involve an intoxicated 
99 JA, supra note 18 at para 43.
100 Ibid at paras 3, 34, 36, 40. The phrase “operating mind” might, were it used 
alone, suggest quite a low legal standard. However, Chief Justice McLachlin’s use of the 
term in the context of a case involving an unconscious complainant as well as the other 
aspects of her description of consent (such as the ability to decide whether to consent or 
withdraw consent to each and every sexual act and the use of the term meaningful consent) 
suggest otherwise.
101 Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Capacity to Consent and Intoxicated 
Complainants in Sexual Assault Prosecutions” (2017) 37:7 Crim Reports 375; Cowan, 
supra note 7.
102 R v Siddiqui, 2004 BCSC 1717 at para 55 [Siddiqui]; R v (A)A, 2001 CanLII 3091 
at paras 7–11, 144 OAC 382 (Ont CA) [AA]. 
103 R v P, 2004 NSCA 27 at para 15. 
104 R v Haraldson, 2012 ABCA 147 at para 7 [Haraldson]. 
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [Vol. 9892
complainant. Nor, as discussed in Part 2, has Parliament provided 
sufficient guidance. Unfortunately, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s 
recent decision in R v Al-Rawi has become the case to which other courts, 
including the Court of Appeal for Ontario,105 are now turning.106 This is 
unfortunate because there are significant flaws with the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal’s reasoning in Al-Rawi. The legal standard for capacity adopted 
in Al-Rawi offers extremely intoxicated, but conscious, women very little 
protection under the criminal law.
Recall that the original trial decision in Al-Rawi was overturned 
because Judge Lenehan equated lack of capacity with unconsciousness. 
The problems with the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision in Al-
Rawi do not relate to its treatment of the trial judgment in this case. 
Rather, it is the legal standard Justice Beveridge adopted for determining 
incapacity, and his application of the precedents he marshalled in support 
of this standard, that are problematic. The legal standard for incapacity 
articulated by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Al-Rawi is as follows:
[a] complainant lacks the requisite capacity to consent if … the complainant did 
not have an operating mind capable of: 
1) appreciating the nature and quality of the sexual activity; or 
2) knowing the identity of the person or persons wishing to engage in the sexual 
activity; or 
3) understanding she could agree or decline to engage in, or to continue, the 
sexual activity.107
In adopting this test, Justice Beveridge relied on the body of case law 
addressing sexual fraud. His language of “the nature and quality of 
the sexual activity” at issue is borrowed directly from the sexual fraud 
caselaw.108 Relying on the law of sexual fraud to establish a standard for 
105 GF, supra note 6.
106 See e.g. Ibid; R v Smalley, 2019 NSSC 32; R v ECC, 2018 YKSC 37; R v TW, 2019 
ONSC 4028; R v Shrivastava, 2018 ABQB 998.
107 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 66.
108 This phrase is also used in cases in which the accused’s mental state renders 
him or her not criminally responsible. It is clear, based on the authorities that Justice 
Beveridge draws upon (R v Cuerrier, [1998] 2 SCR 371, 162 DLR (4th) 513 [Cuerrier]; 
R v Mabior, 2012 SCC 47 [Mabior]; and Hutchinson, supra note 11), that it is the sexual 
fraud jurisprudence, not the ‘not criminally responsible’ jurisprudence from which he 
has borrowed. To be clear, it is different to rely on Hutchinson (which was a sexual fraud 
case) for the overall framework for a consent analysis than it is to rely on the sexual fraud 
jurisprudence for the standard for capacity.
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capacity to consent was an unprecedented shift in the doctrinal approach 
to capacity.109 It is not clear that the principles and legal test developed 
to establish criminal prohibitions on deceptive sex should govern the 
criminal law’s standard for capacity to consent. Certainly the factual 
context and policy implications associated with these two areas of sexual 
assault law seem different. Regardless, three failings in particular should 
be highlighted in Justice Beveridge’s decision in Al-Rawi. 
First, a legal standard for capacity to consent that is based on the 
capacity to appreciate the ‘nature and quality of the sexual activity’ 
establishes an extremely low legal threshold for capacity. Second, devising 
a threshold based on a broad, adjectival standard like ‘the nature and 
quality of the sexual act’ creates an illusive and confusing standard that 
courts have struggled to apply. Third, a standard that focuses on whether 
one understands that they can say ‘yes or no’, rather than on whether one 
has the capacity to give meaningful consent, encourages courts to conclude 
that any evidence of non-consent is dispositive of the issue of capacity—
even if such evidence is not sufficient to establish lack of voluntariness 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
A) A standard based on the ‘nature and quality of the sexual 
activity’ rather than the risks and consequences it presents 
creates an inappropriately low threshold for capacity
The language of ‘the nature and quality of the sexual activity’ used in 
Justice Beveridge’s decision is, as noted, borrowed from the sexual 
fraud caselaw. At common law, prior to the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in R v Cuerrier, an accused’s deception would only vitiate consent 
if the deception went to the nature and quality of the sexual activity.110 
In Cuerrier, an aggravated assault case involving the non-disclosure 
of HIV positive status, the Court highlighted the very narrow scope of 
the common law interpretation of the “nature and quality of the sexual 
109 There are numerous, frequently cited, decisions from trial and appellate courts 
across Canada involving interpretations of the standard for capacity to consent. None 
of these decisions turn to the law of sexual fraud to determine the appropriate standard 
for capacity to consent. See e.g. R v Jensen, 90 OAC 183, 1996 CanLII 1237 (Ont CA) 
[Jensen cited to CanLII]; Tariq, supra note 2; Haraldson, supra note 104; Siddiqui, supra 
note 102; AA, supra note 102 at para 9; R v JWM, 2004 CarswellOnt 1214 (WL Can), 
[2004] OJ No 1295 (QL) (Sup Ct); R v Hinds, 2016 ONSC 95. While it is true that courts in 
capacity cases have looked to Hutchinson, supra note 11, a sexual fraud case, for the overall 
analytical framework for consent, this is much different than relying on the old common 
law definition of sexual fraud to determine the definition of incapacity.
110 R v Petrozzi (1987), 13 BCLR (2d) 273, 1987 CanLII 2786 (CA); Cuerrier, supra 
note 108 at 421.
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activity.”111 A fraud with respect to the presence of sexually transmitted 
infections,112 or the fact that one of the individuals present was a voyeur, 
not a medical intern,113 or that the accused held himself out to be a faith 
healer in order to seduce the complainant,114 would not go to the nature 
and quality of the act. According to its common law interpretation, the 
nature and quality of the sexual act refers to the specifics regarding the 
physical act itself.115 For example, inserting a penis into a complainant’s 
vagina when what she consented to was penetration with a finger would go 
to the nature and quality of the act. However, the nature and quality of the 
act would not include someone’s HIV positive status or the fact that they 
had gonorrhea.116 This is why, in the context of sexual fraud, the Supreme 
Court of Canada established an additional circumstance in which apparent 
consent will be vitiated by fraud. In addition to deceptions that go to the 
nature and quality of the sexual act, ones that result in a significant risk 
of serious bodily harm may also vitiate voluntary agreement or apparent 
consent.117 
Again, according to a long line of sexual fraud cases in which the 
phrase has been interpreted, the nature and quality of the sexual activity 
refers only to the basic physical act and its sexual nature. Unless the 
nature and quality of the act standard is to be interpreted differently in the 
context of capacity to consent than it has been in the jurisprudence from 
which this standard was drawn, Justice Beveridge’s inability to “appreciate 
the nature and quality of the activity” threshold for a finding of incapacity 
creates an extremely low standard. Indeed, he refers to it as a standard of 
“only a ‘minimal capacity.’”118 
Al-Rawi is not the first decision to employ the language of minimal 
capacity. The case most frequently cited, and one that was relied upon 
by Justice Beveridge, is R v Jensen.119 It is true that in Jensen the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario concluded that the complainant in that case should 
not have been found to lack the “minimal capacity” necessary to consent 
111 Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 410; See R v Maurantonio, [1968] 1 OR 145, 65 DLR 
(2d) 674 (CA), in which the majority concluded that pretending to be a doctor conducting 
vaginal exams did go to the nature and quality of the act. The complainants thought they 
were consenting to a medical procedure. See Mabior, supra note 108. 
112 Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 425; R v Clarence (1888), 22 QBD 23 (Eng QB) 
(failure to disclose gonorrhea) [Clarence].
113 Bolduc v The Queen, [1967] SCR 677, 63 DLR (2d) 82 [Bolduc].
114 R v Ramos, 1997 CanLII 1425 at para 11, 101 OAC 211 (Ont CA).
115 Clarence, supra note 112; Bolduc, supra note 113.
116 Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 412, 424 –25; Hutchinson, supra note 11.
117 Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 424, 428, 432.
118 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 59. 
119 Jensen, supra note 109. 
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to sex.120 However, the Court in Jensen also said the following, “[s]he 
was sufficiently aware that she was able to make decisions and act upon 
them.”121 A level of awareness sufficient to ‘make decisions’ (plural) may 
suggest a standard that is higher than the one proposed in Al-Rawi. Not 
only that, in Jensen, the complainant herself testified that she was alert, 
knew what was going on and expressed her non-consent repeatedly.122 
The Court in Jensen was not grappling with an extremely intoxicated 
woman who was conscious enough to understand that she was being 
touched sexually but aware of little, if anything, else. 
In Al-Rawi, Justice Beveridge suggests that the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decision in R v (A)J supports a standard of ‘only a minimal 
capacity’ because Chief Justice McLachlin concluded in that case that 
“Parliament intended consent to mean the conscious consent of an 
operating mind.”123 This interpretation of JA seems wrong. First, Chief 
Justice McLachlin was referring to the difference between a conscious 
and unconscious mind, making this particular passage from JA an 
inappropriate one to rely on in establishing the minimum threshold for 
capacity (unless one seeks to draw the line at unconsciousness).
Second, whether requiring an ‘operating mind’ can or should be 
equated with a standard of minimal capacity is not self-evident. An 
operating mind may very well require more than the minimal capacity 
needed to know that one is being, for example, vaginally penetrated with 
a penis, and that this is a sexual act to which one could say no. Under a 
nature and quality of the sexual activity standard for capacity that would 
be the extent of awareness/understanding required. Instead, to have an 
‘operating mind’ sufficient to grant consent to sex may well require the 
capacity to assess something further, such as the risks and consequences 
of the sexual activity in question. 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s conclusion in JA was that Parliament 
was concerned with ensuring that individuals have the capacity to give 
“meaningful consent.”124 It seems reasonable to suggest that the capacity 
to give meaningful consent requires more than the rudimentary ability 
to understand that one is, for instance, being penetrated with a penis and 
that this act is a sexual one to which one could say no. The capacity to give 
meaningful consent referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada in JA, 
120 Ibid at 8.
121 Ibid at 10.
122 Ibid.
123 JA, supra note 18 at para 36: That only a “minimal capacity” suffices is supported 
by comments by the Supreme Court of Canada that a complainant must have had an 
“operating mind” in order to be capable of consenting to sexual activity.
124 Ibid.
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [Vol. 9896
and this notion of minimal capacity capable of understanding the nature 
and quality of the act, do not appear to establish the same legal standard. 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s language of an operating mind capable of giving 
meaningful consent seems more akin to the cases in which judges have 
asserted that while the standard for capacity is not high, it does require 
the capacity to make reasonably informed decisions. In R v JR, Justice 
Ducharme described the threshold in this way, “[t]he question is whether 
or not the complainant was able to make a voluntary and informed decision, 
not whether she later regretted her decision or whether she would not have 
made the same decision if she had been sober.”125 In R v Innes the Court 
stated, “[t]here is no requirement that a complainant be a virtual robot 
before she will be found to be incapable of consenting to sexual activity. 
Consent requires a reasonably informed choice, freely exercised, without 
interference with the freedom of a person’s will.”126 In R v Saint-Laurent, 
Justice Fish stated, “[a]s a matter both of language and of law, consent 
implies a reasonably informed choice, freely exercised.”127 In R v (A)A (in 
discussing the capacity of complainants with intellectual disabilities), the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario specified that, “no consent is obtained where 
the complainant is incapable of consenting. A valid consent is an informed 
consent. Therefore, the individual must be able to understand the risks 
and consequences associated with the activity to be engaged in.”128
Intervenors before the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Al-Rawi 
suggested that the standard for capacity should include: the ability to 
assess the physical and social risks and consequences associated with the 
act in the particular circumstance confronting the complainant.129 Courts 
in several other cases have articulated a threshold that requires the ability 
to assess the risks and consequences of engaging in the sexual activity in 
question.130 Justice Beveridge rejected this approach. He stated, “requiring 
the cognitive ability necessary to weigh the risks and consequences of 
agreeing to engage in the sexual activity goes too far.”131 He offered no 
reasons, examples, or explanation as to why such a standard would “go too 
125 R v JR, 2006 CanLII 22658 at para 43, 40 CR (6th) 97(Ont Sup Ct) [JR] [emphasis 
added].
126 R v Innes,  [2004] OJ No 4150 (QL) at para 24, [2004] OTC 888 (Sup Ct) 
[emphasis added].
127 R v Saint-Laurent (1993), [1994] RJQ 69, 1993 CarswellQue 2111 (WL Can) at 
para 95 (CA) [Saint-Laurent cited to WL Can] [emphasis added]. 
128 AA, supra note 102 at para 9 [emphasis added] (capacity in this case related to 
the complainant’s intellectual disability).
129 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 36 (LEAF Factum). 
130 See e.g. Siddiqui, supra note 102; AA, supra note 102; JR, supra note 125; R v 
Zadeh, 2015 BCPC 192.
131 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 61.
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far.”132 Similarly, in GF, the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated, “capacity 
for considered evaluation of the collateral risks and consequences of 
sexual activity sets the bar too high for capacity to consent to sexual 
relations.”133 Like Justice Beveridge, Justice Pardu offered no reasons or 
analysis to support this assertion (beyond reliance on the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal’s decision in Al-Rawi). Nor did her decision include any 
explanation as to what constitutes collateral risks and consequences, as 
opposed to primary or non-collateral risks and consequences. 
Justice Beveridge’s rejection of a ‘capacity to appreciate risks and 
consequences standard’ in favour of ‘the capacity to understand the 
nature and quality of the sexual act standard’ is insufficiently protective of 
women’s sexual integrity. Oddly, the conflation in Al-Rawi of two discrete 
areas of sexual assault law (fraud and capacity to consent) inadvertently 
raises an example that demonstrates this insufficiency. 
Consider the following scenario. The accused and the complainant 
engage in voluntary, unprotected, vaginal penetration to the point of 
ejaculation. The accused is HIV positive and unmedicated, making his 
viral load (his degree of infectiousness)134 higher than it would be if he was 
properly medicated. Prior to the sexual activity, he told the complainant of 
his HIV status. The complainant was severely intoxicated at the time of the 
sexual activity but had the ‘minimal capacity’ necessary to understand that 
she was being vaginally penetrated by the accused and that she could say 
no. She was too drunk, however, to assess the risks and consequences of 
engaging in unprotected, vaginal intercourse with someone who was HIV 
positive and unmedicated. The level of minimal functioning needed to 
comprehend that one is being vaginally penetrated and by whom, and that 
one could say no, is clearly lower than the capacity needed to assess the 
risks and consequences of having sex with someone who is HIV positive, 
which turn on the presence or absence of a condom, whether ejaculation 
occurs and if so whether it occurs inside or outside the vagina, whether the 
individual is properly and consistently medicated and for how long, and 
whether they have a high viral load.135 
Based on the reasoning in Al-Rawi, the offence of sexual assault in 
Canada offers no legal protection for this woman. In other words, based 
on Justice Beveridge’s decision and provided he discloses his status, our 
sexual assault law does not prohibit this accused from ejaculating inside of 
severely intoxicated women he knows are too drunk to assess the risks of 
132 Ibid.
133 GF, supra note 6 at para 36.
134 Mabior, supra note 108 at para 100.
135 Ibid at paras 93–103.
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permitting someone with his HIV status to do to them. Similarly, the law 
of sexual assault would offer no protection to, nor prohibit him from doing 
this to, a woman whose intellectual disability meant she could appreciate 
the sexual nature of the act to which she was consenting, but lacked the 
mental capacity to understand the risks and consequences of consenting 
to this act with someone with his medical condition, without a condom.136 
Now consider a slightly modified scenario in which the above facts 
remain the same except that the accused does not disclose his HIV status 
to the severely intoxicated (or intellectually disabled) complainant. The 
Supreme Court of Canada adopted a two-part test to determine whether 
consent to sexual activity was vitiated by deceptions with respect to 
HIV status in Cuerrier: (1) there must be proof of dishonesty and either 
deprivation or risk of deprivation. The deprivation may consist of actual 
harm or a significant risk of harm; and (2) the trier of fact must be 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant would not 
have consented to the sexual activity had they known that the accused was 
HIV positive.137 How could the Crown prove the latter in a case in which 
the evidence suggests a severely intoxicated or intellectually disabled 
complainant who knew she was having sex and could say ‘no’ but lacked 
the capacity to understand the risks imposed upon her of doing so? In 
that situation what difference would it make if the accused had told her of 
his HIV status—she may well have engaged in the sexual activity anyway 
because she lacked the capacity to understand the significance of that 
status for her. Indeed, how could we not have a reasonable doubt as to 
what she would have done if the accused had shared his HIV status with 
her given that she lacked the capacity to assess this information? Based on 
the reasoning in Al-Rawi it would certainly be open to defence counsel to 
make this argument. 
136 Conversely, a standard which focussed on a complainant’s ability to appreciate 
the risks and consequences of the act would offer this protection to an intellectually 
disabled woman. In R v Comeau, 2017 NSSC 62, a pre-Al-Rawi decision, Justice Duncan 
found that a woman in her mid 70s with dementia and living in a residential care facility 
did not have capacity to consent to the sexual contact which occurred with the facility’s 
custodian. She could walk and talk with others and had the capacity to express voluntary 
agreement. She initiated the sexual contact with the accused. Justice Duncan concluded 
at para 49: “Ms. W. was unable to understand the risks and consequences associated with 
the activity she engaged in with Mr. Comeau … Ms. W. lacked the necessary capacity to 
consent to the sexual activity that she engaged in with Mr. Comeau”.
137 Cuerrier, supra note 108. See e.g. R v Pottelberg, 2010 ONSC 5756, in which the 
Court acquitted on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant would 
not have consented had he known the accused was HIV positive. The Cuerrier test was 
affirmed in Mabior, supra note 108, at paras 104–05.
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There are problems with Canada’s sexual fraud laws.138 However, 
given that the law of sexual assault criminalizes the non-disclosure of HIV 
positive status in circumstances in which there is (what the Court has 
deemed to be139) a sufficient risk of transmission, it is unjust to exclude 
from its protection severely intoxicated women and some intellectually 
disabled women. It makes little sense to establish a legal regime in which 
women who are more vulnerable (whatever the cause of their incapacity) 
receive less legal protection than those with greater capacity to protect 
themselves. Yet in Nova Scotia (and Ontario as well, depending on what 
the Court in GF meant by collateral risks and consequences) women who 
lack the capacity to understand the risks and consequences of allowing 
an unmedicated, HIV positive accused to ejaculate inside of them, do not 
receive the same legal protection as women who are not incapacitated in this 
manner. This is also true for severely intoxicated and some intellectually 
disabled men who have sex with men. It was inappropriate to base his 
rejection of the capacity to understand risks and consequences as part of 
the necessary threshold for capacity to consent on the Supreme Court’s 
deceptive sex jurisprudence. In addition, the standard Justice Beveridge 
adopted in Al-Rawi in fact undermines the objectives underpinning the 
sexual fraud jurisprudence in Canada.
Justice Beveridge appears to have based his rejection of a capacity 
standard that requires the ability to assess risks and consequences on 
a misunderstanding of the Supreme Court of Canada’s sexual fraud 
jurisprudence. He asserts that: 
[t]he proposed requirement that a complainant have the cognitive ability to 
appreciate and assess the risks and consequences of the sexual act in question is 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s rejection in R v Cuerrier, R v Mabior and R v 
Hutchinson that knowledge of the risks and consequences of the act are necessary 
components of a valid consent.140 
He then notes that, “[d]eception about risks and consequences that expose 
a complainant to serious risk of harm may vitiate consent, but it is not 
part of the initial analysis.”141 What Justice Beveridge’s reasoning appears 
to have overlooked is that capacity is also not a part of the initial analysis. 
138 See Isabel Grant, “The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: The Criminalization 
of the Non-Disclosure of HIV” (2008) 31:1 Dal LJ 123; Isabel Grant, “The Prosecution 
of Non-Disclosure of HIV in Canada: Time to Rethink Cuerrier” (2011) 5:1 McGill JL & 
Health 7; Isabel Grant, “Rethinking Risk: The Relevance of Condoms and Viral Load in 
HIV Nondisclosure Prosecutions” (2009) 54:2 McGill LJ 389; Martha Shaffer, “Sex, Lies 
and HIV: Mabior and the Concept of Sexual Fraud” (2013) 63:3 UTLJ 466.
139 Mabior, supra note 108.
140 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 38.
141 Ibid at para 39.
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Recall that the legislative framework for determining consent involves 
a two-stage process.142 The issue of capacity, like fraud, is considered at 
the second stage of the analysis, under section 273.1(2) (or in the case 
of fraud under section 265(3)(c)). While unconsciousness should be 
considered at the first stage of the analysis, because an unconscious person 
cannot voluntarily agree to have sex, whether a complainant’s voluntary 
agreement was legally ineffective due to lack of capacity is to be assessed at 
the second stage. It occurs after a trier of fact has determined that there was 
apparent consent or voluntary agreement or a reasonable doubt regarding 
lack of apparent consent. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Cuerrier, Mabior and Hutchinson 
did determine that knowledge of some risks and consequences is a 
necessary component of a valid consent, such as the risk of pregnancy143 
or the non-trivial risk of contracting HIV.144 In all three of these cases, 
the Court found that the complainant’s lack of knowledge of the physical 
risks and consequences caused by the accused’s deception rendered the 
complainants’ apparent consent legally ineffective. Indeed, the majority in 
Cuerrier, the first in this line of decisions, determined that the scope of the 
duty to disclose turns on the degree of risk, “[t]o put it in the context of 
fraud the greater the risk of deprivation the higher the duty of disclosure 
… The nature and extent of the duty to disclose, if any, will always have 
to be considered in the context of the particular facts presented.”145 
Similarly, the majority in Hutchinson stated that, “[w]hat was critical to 
[the complainant] was contraception and what she sought to mitigate 
was the risk of pregnancy.”146 Cuerrier, Mabior and Hutchinson did not 
remove knowledge of risks and consequences as a necessary component 
of valid consent. To the contrary, the concept of physical risks and 
consequences is the operative part of the sexual fraud doctrine developed 
in Cuerrier, Mabior and Hutchinson. That the issue of fraud, like the issue 
of capacity, is to be considered at the second stage of the analysis does 
not change the fact that under Canadian law a valid consent does indeed 
require knowledge of risks and consequences that pose a significant threat 
of serious harm. But why require that this knowledge be given to severely 
intoxicated and some intellectually disabled women if the law does not 
require that they have the capacity to understand its significance for 
them? Justice Beveridge’s reasons appear not to have accounted for this 
implication of his decision.
142 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 57; GF, supra note 6 at para 41.
143 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 70.
144 Cuerrier, supra note 108; Mabior, supra note 108.
145 Cuerrier, supra note 108 at 431.
146 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 48.
Sexual Assault and Intoxication: Defining (In)Capacity to …2020] 101
To be clear, the Court in each of Cuerrier, Mabior and Hutchinson did 
confirm that an accused is not required to disclose knowledge of all risks 
and consequences, physical or social. For example, an individual does 
not have to disclose risks to a sexual partner’s health that fall below the 
threshold of serious bodily harm. Presumably this is because we assume, 
as a policy matter, that people should be responsible for assessing these 
types risks for themselves and that a failure to disclose them does not 
warrant criminal sanction.147 After all, sex and risk are familiar bedmates. 
Absent risks and consequences that pose a significant risk of serious bodily 
harm148 or that could result in fundamental physical changes to a woman’s 
body (such as pregnancy),149 Canadian sexual fraud jurisprudence places 
responsibility on complainants to gather information for themselves or 
to take necessary steps to protect themselves before voluntarily agreeing 
to the sexual activity in question. The correlative implication of this legal 
distribution of responsibility, one that arises directly from the sexual fraud 
jurisprudence, is as follows: if there is no legal burden on an accused to 
disclose a broader range of known risks and consequences, surely we 
must require a threshold of capacity that includes a woman’s ability to 
identify at least some of these risks and consequences for herself. That 
is to say, since an individual is not legally obligated under the law of 
sexual assault to, for example, disclose sexually transmitted infections like 
chlamydia, shouldn’t the standard for capacity to consent require at least 
the level of awareness and understanding necessary to observe and assess 
the risks associated with agreeing to be vaginally penetrated by someone 
whose penis is obviously oozing discharge or whose testicles are red and 
inflamed? Similarly, since an individual is not legally obligated to disclose 
that they have, for example, contracted chlamydia or gonorrhea and could 
infect someone, it is only just that the standard for capacity to consent 
not be less than that necessary to insist that a condom is used (whether 
that be to avoid pregnancy or a sexually transmitted infection).150 Fairness 
and even a modest commitment to protecting women’s sexual integrity 
and physical autonomy demands that we have a standard of capacity that 
corresponds to the legal approach to sexual fraud. 
147 Gotell 2008, supra note 75. As Lise Gotell’s work has ably demonstrated, this 
neo-liberal risk allocation approach to the issue of sexualized violence perpetuates victim 
blaming and fails to account for the systemic inequalities that produce this gendered 
violence. My argument is not intended to detract from this important critique or endorse 
the neo-liberalism inherent in our current laws. My point is that this allocation of 
responsibility to sexual actors in the sexual fraud jurisprudence should be recognized in 
the incapacity to consent jurisprudence. 
148 Cuerrier, supra note 108; Mabior, supra note 108.
149 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 70.
150 That any particular woman may not be inclined to insist on condom use or 
watch for outward symptoms of sexually transmitted infections, sober or intoxicated, has 
no bearing on what level of protection should be afforded under the criminal law.
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While it was problematic to establish a legal standard for capacity 
based on the sexual fraud jurisprudence, Justice Beveridge’s reasoning 
does encourage us to consider these discrete legal issues in relation to 
one another. However, contrary to Justice Beveridge’s conclusions, the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the issue of sexual fraud very 
much suggests that the ability to appreciate at least some risks and 
consequences should be part of the legal standard for capacity to consent 
to sexual touching. 
B) The ‘nature and quality of the sexual activity’ standard is 
inherently unclear and difficult to apply
The second problem with relying on ‘the ability to appreciate the nature 
and quality of the sexual activity’ as the standard for capacity is that 
there are inherent difficulties with attempting to make legal distinctions 
based on this language. As the Court highlighted in Hutchinson, “courts 
experienced great difficulty in formulating principled reasons for why a 
certain deception did or did not relate to the nature and quality of the 
act.”151 In Hutchinson the majority unequivocally rejected this approach, 
stating, “[t]he problem was where and how to draw the line between 
those aspects of the sexual activity that went to the ‘nature and quality 
of the act’ and those that did not.”152 The Court went on to conclude 
that, “[t]he lesson is clear. Broad adjectival approaches to ‘the sexual 
activity in question’ … [are] too unclear, too easily manipulated, and too 
unconnected with underlying policy rationales to provide a useful marker 
of liability.”153 There is no reason to think a standard based on the nature 
and quality of the sexual act will be clearer, less easy to manipulate, or 
more connected to policy rationales in the capacity context than it was in 
the sexual fraud context. 
C) A standard which focuses on whether one understands 
they can say yes or no rather than on whether one has 
the capacity to give meaningful consent is insufficiently 
protective of women’s sexual integrity 
The third criterion included in the standard for capacity articulated in Al-
Rawi focuses on whether the complainant had the capacity to understand 
that she could agree or decline to participate in the sexual activity in 
question. This criterion is also a problem. In some cases, if the complainant 
provides any evidence of non-consent the court uses that as evidence that 
151 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 50.
152 Ibid at para 30.
153 Ibid at paras 52–53. The majority’s approach in Hutchinson requires further 
consideration. The majority’s interpretation of section 273.1 is problematically narrow. 
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she did not lack capacity.154 A standard of capacity that requires only the 
ability to know that a sexual act is occurring and that one can say ‘yes or 
no’ encourages this type of reasoning. A state of non-consent and lack of 
capacity to consent should not be treated as necessarily incongruent. 
That a woman has the minimal capacity necessary to mumble 
an incoherent ‘no’ or manage an attempt at evasion in response to 
unwanted sexual touching should not be equated with the capacity to 
give “meaningful consent” to engage in the sexual activity at issue. 155 A 
standard of capacity that turns on whether a complainant understood that 
she could agree or decline to participate, rather than on her capacity to 
make a meaningful choice, encourages judges to conclude that if she was 
sober enough to say no at any point during the sexual contact, incapacity 
cannot be established. The risk is that any evidence that the complainant 
communicated non-consent may be deemed dispositive of the capacity 
issue while insufficient to establish involuntariness beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In addition, as Grant and Benedet have argued, the capacity to say no 
may be lower than that necessary to meaningfully consent.156 A legal test 
that turns on a complainant’s capacity to understand that she can agree or 
decline to participate risks obscuring this important distinction. 
To summarize, the legal standard established in Al-Rawi does not 
protect severely intoxicated women in some of the most vulnerable 
sexual circumstances. It sets the legal standard too low and does not 
provide courts with clear language upon which to make assessments of 
capacity, which will undoubtedly encourage trial judges to continue to 
rely on unconsciousness as the evidentiary proxy for incapacity. It is not 
consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s articulation of consent in 
JA and it risks encouraging courts to treat any evidence of non-consent as 
dispositive of the issue of incapacity. 
5. Capacity to Assess the Risks and Consequences of  
the Sexual Activity at Issue Would Provide a Clearer,  
More Just Standard
A standard that requires the ability to assess the risks and consequences 
of engaging in the sexual activity in question is more consistent with 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach in cases like JA and more 
154 See e.g. R v Palmer-Coke, 2017 ONSC 4501 at paras 91–92; MRN, supra note 44; 
R v Sawyer, 2014 ONCJ 186.
155 JA, supra note 18 at para 36.
156 See Benedet & Grant, supra note 101 at 3.
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appropriately protective of intoxicated women’s sexual integrity. 
Professors Benedet and Grant argue that an assessment of capacity to 
consent should be context-specific. A legal standard for capacity that is 
based on the ability to appreciate risks and consequences must recognize 
that the level of cognitive ability required to give meaningful consent will 
vary depending on the context. It may, for example, require a higher level 
of capacity to consent to sex with a stranger in a taxicab than to consent 
to an intimate partner in a non-abusive relationship. It may also require 
a higher level of capacity to consent to unprotected sexual intercourse 
than to a kiss.157 Their suggestion is not intended to encourage judges 
to inquire into the advisability of a woman’s particular sexual choices, 
but rather to suggest that the level of capacity required turns on the 
degree of risk and the nature of potential consequences: “the risks and 
consequences of consenting are different in different situations and the 
ability to understand more serious risks and consequences may in turn 
require a higher level of capacity.”158 For instance, the level of capacity 
needed to make a meaningful choice to have unprotected sex with 
someone who is HIV positive will be higher than that required to consent 
to have protected sex with an HIV positive individual. A higher level of 
capacity may be necessary to make a meaningful choice to have sex with 
multiple, unknown men at once than would be needed to consent to the 
same sexual activities with one’s ongoing sexual partner.
This situational or contextual approach to assessing capacity to 
understand the risks and consequences associated with the sexual activity 
in question is compelling. It is important to emphasize that the threshold 
legal question under this approach should be context-specific rather than 
complainant-specific. In addition, the inquiry should not be whether 
the complainant did assess the risks and consequences presented by a 
particular context, but rather whether she had the capacity to make this 
assessment. This is because a complainant-specific inquiry, as opposed 
to a context-specific one, might encourage questions about, or reasoning 
based on, the complainant’s individual tolerance for risk. This approach 
would inevitably lead to consideration of her past sexual choices. A context-
specific inquiry should focus the analysis on factors such as the type of 
sexual activity, the location, the relationship between the parties, and the 
health status of the accused, not the complainant’s sexual propensities.
The same is true with respect to a focus on whether she assessed the 
risks and consequences, rather than on whether she had the capacity to 
make this assessment given her level of intoxication. A focus on whether 
she assessed the risks and consequences might encourage questions such as 
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
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159 Ibid. 
160 There has been substantial empirical research demonstrating the pervasiveness 
of these stereotypes. See Karla Stormo et al, “Attributions About Acquaintance Rape: The 
Role of Alcohol and Individual Differences” (1997) 27:4 J Applied Soc Psychology 279 
at 301; Ashley A Wenger & Brian H Bornstein, “The Effects of Victim’s Substance Use 
and Relationship Closeness on Mock Jurors’ Judgments in an Acquaintance Rape Case” 
(2006) 54:7 Sex Roles 547 at 552; Emily Finch & Vanessa E Munro, “Juror Stereotypes 
and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases Involving Intoxicants: The Finding of a Pilot Study” 
(2005) 45:1 Brit J Crim 25 [Finch & Munro, “Juror Stereotypes”]; Emily Finch & Vanessa 
E Munro, “The Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-Sexual Stereotypes 
and Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants” (2007) 16:4 Soc 
& Leg Stud 591 [Finch & Munro, “The Demon Drink”]; Amy Grubb & Emily Turner, 
“Attribution of Blame in Rape Cases: A Review of the Impact of Rape Myth Acceptance, 
Gender Role Conformity, and Substance Use on Victim Blaming” (2012) 17:5 Aggression 
& Violent Behavior 443 at 444.
the following: ‘well, is it not true that you have had consensual, unprotected 
sex with strangers when you were not intoxicated?’ Conversely, a focus on 
whether she had the capacity to assess the particular risks and consequences 
should emphasize her level of intoxication and make her previous sexual 
choices, drunk or sober, irrelevant.
In other words, a standard that is context (not complainant) specific 
and that focusses on whether a complainant could (not did) assess the 
risks and consequences associated with that context should not create a 
basis for admitting (or relying upon) evidence of a complainant’s other 
sexual activity that would otherwise be excluded under section 276 of the 
Criminal Code.
In their recent work, Professors Benedet and Grant observe that even 
judges who articulate a standard that includes the ability to understand 
risks and consequences often do not then apply it when assessing the 
evidence:
While judges often refer to the standard of being able to understand “the risks 
and consequences associated with the activity to be engaged in,” when asked to 
apply the standard to an individual complainant, the ability to assess potential 
risks and consequences disappears from the analysis, even though it is at the heart 
of consent standards outside of sexual assault.159
It is not clear why the risks and consequences element of the standard 
seems to fall away at the application stage of the analysis in some cases. 
One plausible explanation is that this tendency is rooted in stereotypical 
assumptions about drunk women.160 Common stereotypes about women 
who consume alcohol include the beliefs that they are: responsible for 
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any consequences they suffer;161 sexually promiscuous or indiscriminate 
in their sexual choices;162 and more likely to lie about rape.163 These 
stereotypes have certainly informed the body of caselaw we are left with 
today.164 It may be that even in cases in which a higher legal standard for 
capacity is articulated—such as one that includes the ability to appreciate 
risks and consequences—the application of this standard to the evidence 
is distorted by stereotypical thinking about women, sex, and alcohol.
One further point regarding the legal standard in cases involving 
intoxicated complainants should be flagged. Accused individuals should 
not be permitted to avail themselves of the honest but mistaken belief in 
communicated consent defence on the basis that they were unaware of a 
complainant’s state of severe intoxication.165 Unless there is evidence that 
the accused took reasonable steps (in the circumstances known to him) to 
ascertain both her consent and the complainant’s capacity to consent the 
defence should not be considered. Unfortunately, courts have not reliably 
applied this doctrine.166 
161 For a general discussion of victim blaming stereotypes involving women who 
were intoxicated at the time of the alleged sexual assault, see e.g. Wenger & Bornstein, 
supra note 160 at 552; Finch & Munro, “Juror Stereotypes”, supra note 160 at 29–32, Emily 
Finch and Vanessa Munroe’s research demonstrating that mock jurors are more likely to 
blame sexual assault complainants for what occurred than those who are involuntarily 
intoxicated raises the prospect of this victim blaming: Stormo et al, supra note 160. 
162 There is a difference between accepting the increased confidence, sociability and 
diminished judgment of someone who is moderately intoxicated (to which experts have 
testified, Al-Rawi 2019, supra note 42 at paras 118–20) and believing the stereotype that 
when women consume alcohol, they become sexually indiscriminate.
163 Philip Rumney, “False Allegations of Rape” (2004) 65:1 Cambridge LJ 128 
(disputing the prevalence of false allegations); Finch & Munro, “Juror Stereotypes”, supra 
note 160. 
164 See supra, note 161.
165 For a discussion of this defence in the context of incapacitated complainants see 
Elizabeth Sheehy, “Judges and the Reasonable Steps Requirement: The Judicial Stance on 
Perpetration Against Unconscious Women” in Elizabeth Sheehy, eds, Sexual Assault in 
Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 
2012) 483 at 517. See also section 273.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code, supra note 10.
166 Ibid. See e.g. R v Dippel, 2010 CarswellAlta 2713 (WL Can) (QB) (acquitted 
on the basis of the defence despite no discussion of any evidence indicating that he took 
reasonable step sin the circumstance known to him, rev’d 2011 ABCA 129); R v Lariviere, 
2017 SKPC 41 (acquitted on the basis of the defence in reasons which conclude he took 
reasonable steps but did not identify what those steps were); R v Alboukhari, 2013 ONCA 
581 (in which a conviction was overturned on the basis of the trial judge’s misapprehension 
of evidence with respect to the circumstances known to the accused but the Court of 
Appeal failed to explain what possible steps, based on the evidentiary record, could have 
been relied upon by the defence).
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6. Conclusion
The criminal law, as the Supreme Court noted in Hutchinson, draws a 
line between conduct deserving of the harsh sanction of the criminal law, 
and conduct that is undesirable or unethical but “lacks the reprehensible 
character of criminal acts.”167 Is having sex with someone you know is 
severely intoxicated—someone you know is, for example, too drunk to 
insist on a condom, or notice the multiple sores on and around your penis, 
or appreciate the social consequences of doing so in front of your whole 
hockey team—sufficiently reprehensible such that it warrants the censure 
of the criminal law? Or is this merely unethical or undesirable, but not 
reprehensible, sexual conduct? 
The trial judge in Al-Rawi suggested that the accused had a “moral” 
or “ethical” (but not legal) obligation not to “tak[e] advantage” of the 
severely intoxicated complainant by “going along” with any flirtation or 
sexual invitation that the trial judge speculated might have occurred in that 
case.168 Recall that the complainant in that case was so intoxicated she had 
lost control of her bladder and was either unconscious, or within seconds 
or minutes of becoming unconscious, when her clothing was removed. 
Is ‘taking advantage’ of a woman in that condition merely undesirable or 
unethical or is it the type of sexual conduct that the criminal law should 
prohibit? 
A trial judge’s task in a case involving an intoxicated complainant is 
unenviable and made harder by the lack of guidance courts have received 
from Parliament. Toxicology evidence is often unavailable or inconclusive. 
The legal precedents by which they are bound articulate a legal standard 
which encourages judges to rely on unconsciousness as the evidentiary 
proxy. But the failure to find that severely intoxicated women—women 
who cannot walk properly, who have vomited on themselves, or are 
confused as to their whereabouts and what happened—lack capacity 
may also stem in part from a refusal to recognize that engaging in sex 
with someone in this condition is sufficiently reprehensible such that it 
should be criminally prohibited. To return to the questions poised in the 
opening paragraph: why can’t courts find that a woman who is “falling 
down drunk,”169 or has vomited on herself and can’t remember anything 
that happened,170 or is unable to dress herself properly and is “puking up 
leaves”171 lacks the capacity to consent to sex? Why would incorporating 
167 Hutchinson, supra note 11 at para 18.
168 R v Al-Rawi 2017, supra note 42.
169 Tariq, supra note 2.
170 TJ, supra note 3.
171 KC, supra note 4.
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into the legal standard the ability to appreciate the risks and consequences 
(or some of them) of choosing to engage in the sexual activity in question 
“go too far?”172 Unfortunately the answer to these questions may be 
rooted in problematic social assumptions about women who get drunk: 
that they are partly to blame for what occurred; that they are not to be 
trusted; that, when drunk, women will consent to sex anywhere with 
anyone even if they would not engage in this same behavior when sober. 
Equally problematic is the attitude that the sexual predation of women in 
this condition is caddish not criminal. 
The legal standard applied in sexual assault cases involving severely 
intoxicated women should require more than the rudimentary ability 
or awareness necessary to know that sexual contact is occurring and 
that one could say no. Providing trial judges with a more demanding 
legal standard would encourage them to give more weight to evidence 
of severe intoxication short of unconsciousness. However, raising this 
threshold (through both the evidentiary proxies relied upon to establish 
lack of capacity and the legal standard itself) will only be effective if we 
can eliminate the influence of discriminatory social assumptions and 
recognize that the sexual predation of drunk women warrants the criminal 
law’s censure.
172 Al-Rawi (NSCA), supra note 1 at para 61.
